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ABSTRACT
Parliamentary approval can be of crucial importance to ensure the democratic
legitimacy of military operations as it can establish public consent to the execu-
tive’s use of force. But involving parliament in decisions to deploy military forces
may have negative repercussions on the efficiency of operations, e.g. by slowing
down decision-making. As the military activity of democracies has been on the rise
since the end of the Cold War, democracies around the world have been increas-
ingly pressed to deal with this trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency in
sending troops abroad. This paper surveys the deployment provisions of 49 con-
temporary democracies to establish whether and how parliaments are actually
involved in deployment decisions. It demonstrates that the rules for parliamentary
participation mark a continuum that ranges from complete exclusion to a compre-
hensive veto position of parliament over all potential deployments. In between
these two extremes, democracies have found a wide variety of solutions to cope
with the legitimacy-efficiency problem. Despite the growing prevalence of military
deployments, there is no discernible trend towards parliamentarisation, however.
Rather the trend towards internationalisation of security policies contributed to a
weakening of parliamentary powers in some countries.
SINCE THE end of the Cold War, military deployments by liberal
democracies have become more and more common. Until then, involve-
ment in actual armed conflict had been limited to a rather small
number of democracies, mainly the USA, Israel, India, the UK, France
and Australia.2 Most other democracies maintained large armies for a
worst-case scenario of homeland defence that—fortunately—never
materialised. If deployed at all, these armed forces contributed to
peace-keeping operations that only allowed the use of force in excep-
tional cases of self-defence. It was only in the course of the 1990s that
United Nations (UN)-mandated operations increasingly allowed for the
use of force with the development of ‘robust’ peace-keeping, peace-
enforcement operations and UN-mandated operations to combat ter-
rorism or piracy. Democracies have been particularly frequent contri-
butors to these missions.3 In NATO’s Kosovo campaign in 1999 and
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the US-led war some democracies even engaged in military operations
not explicitly authorised by the UN.
This new military activism of democracies has revived debates about
the role of parliaments in decision-making on the use of force. Since
the end of the Cold War, many democracies have reformed their
deployment regimes and attempted to find an adequate place for par-
liaments in them. In doing so, they saw themselves faced with a formid-
able dilemma. On the one hand, parliamentary participation in
decision-making may appear as a useful tool or even a crucial prerequi-
site to provide military deployments with much-needed legitimacy. On
the other hand, however, parliamentary involvement may be held to
endanger the efficiency of force deployments. Moreover, the emphasis
which, in the past two decades, has been placed on ‘rapid reaction’ to
international crises militates against the involvement of additional
actors in the force deployment process. How did democracies deal with
this dilemma?
This paper investigates in detail how democracies around the globe
have attempted to resolve this trade-off between legitimacy and effi-
ciency regarding parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions.
Although deployment legislation and the role which is accorded to par-
liaments have received growing attention by legal as well as political
science scholars the scope of past investigations has usually been con-
fined to the transatlantic region.4 Not surprisingly, most studies
focused on the militarily most active democracies, especially on the
USA whose war powers have, moreover, attracted a lot of commentary
due to their contested nature;5 and on the member states of the
Western security institutions NATO, EU and WEU.6
In contrast, this paper looks at almost 50 democracies worldwide.
Based on a new data set,7 which covers the war powers of parliaments
in 49 democracies since the end of the Cold War, we can paint a more
comprehensive picture of the roles parliaments play in decision-making
on the use of armed force and discuss how democracies attempt to fine-
tune the balance between the conflicting requirements of military effi-
ciency and democratic legitimacy. We begin our discussion by briefly
reviewing the debate about the desirability of parliamentary involve-
ment in deployment decisions. Based on our data set on parliamentary
control of military missions, we then map the war powers in contem-
porary democracies and discuss main trends and patterns. It will
become clear that the most influential oversight instrument, namely
full-blown ex ante veto power across all military missions, is granted
only to a minority of parliaments worldwide. Yet democracies have
found many other ways to involve parliaments in decision-making
about military deployments, making a multitude of distinctions
between the types of operations over which parliaments have a say and
the stages at which they become involved in the decision-making
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process. An overall trend towards the parliamentarisation of war
powers, which has been claimed to exist,8 is not discernible, however.
The case for and against parliamentary war powers
Critics of parliamentary war powers can refer to an impressive list of
thinkers who argued against the involvement of parliament in decision-
making over military missions. Machiavelli, John Locke, Montesquieu
and Alexis de Tocqueville all argued that the executive should be able
to decide autonomously over the deployment of armed forces.9 Even
though the nature of armed conflict and the international system more
broadly underwent dramatic changes since the times of these thinkers,
the basic arguments against parliamentary involvement remained, by
and large, the same: first and most importantly, the involvement of
parliament is seen to undermine the efficiency of military operations
which requires ‘secrecy, security and surprise’.10 According to Rasler
and Thompson, ‘decentralising power in the face of threat would seem
inefficient and highly dangerous, perhaps even inviting attack’.11
Second, parliamentary involvement is regarded to blur the distinction
between executive and legislative responsibilities. As a legislator, par-
liament may decide on rules governing the use of armed force but
should refrain from deciding over individual missions. Moreover, par-
liament’s ability to hold government accountable for its decisions does
not square well with its claim for influencing these decisions in the first
place. The only modern addition to these traditional arguments is the
notion that parliamentary involvement makes joint military missions
with other countries more difficult, complicated and, as a consequence,
less efficient.
In contrast, proponents of parliamentary war powers emphasise that
despite such concerns about efficiency, the use of force requires a
special effort to ensure its legitimacy. Few decisions have a more severe
impact on the lives of citizens than decisions on military missions, and
therefore no meaningful notion of democracy could possibly exempt
them from parliamentary control.12 Countering critics’ arguments
about military efficiency, they argue that provisions can easily be made
to allow for swift reaction to outside attack while putting participation
in ‘wars of choice’ under tighter restraints.13 Furthermore, proponents
argue that the support of parliaments has a beneficial effect on military
morale. General Sir Michael Rose testified to the House of Lords that
‘[t]here can be no more debilitating effect on the morale of members of
the armed forces for them to know that their country does not support
the mission [. . .]. A formal requirement for prior parliamentary author-
isation for entering into conflict situations can therefore only be of
benefit to members of the armed forces’.14 Finally, proponents of par-
liamentary war powers argue that the quality of decisions improve
when they are taken with the involvement of parliament (or the public
more broadly) instead of small cabinet circles. Ever since Immanuel
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Kant’s Perpetual Peace, this line of reasoning has come with a pacifist
flavour because if ‘the consent of the citizens is required to decide
whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will
have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise’.15
More recently, empirical studies have found evidence for various
effects of democratic control of security policy: democracies have been
found to be more likely to win the wars they fight because deliberation
and accountability lead to a more careful selection of conflict involve-
ments16 and to inflict fewer casualties on their own as well as their
opponent’s civilian population.17 In a similar vein, Dieterich, Hummel
and Marschall found evidence that democracies with weak parliamen-
tary control were more likely to participate in the Iraq War.18
However, the Iraq War also demonstrates that a parliamentary vote
does not automatically ensure democratic legitimacy. In the UK, for
example, the Iraq War remained unpopular despite cross-party support
for a government motion in favour of invasion on its eve.19 The British
example serves as a reminder that in parliamentary systems, MPs of the
party (and occasionally: parties) in government risk the fall of govern-
ment and, by extension, their own re-election, when refusing to
support government policy.
Remarkably, proponents and critics of parliamentary control do not
dispute that parliamentary involvement slows down decision-making
over military missions and increases public ex ante scrutiny to the
effect that, if conflicting, the interests of a reluctant public are more
likely to trump security considerations. The main disagreement con-
cerns the desirability of this effect with critics having more confidence
in the executive’s capacity to respond adequately to international press-
ures and requirements and proponents being more alarmed about pos-
sibilities of misjudgement and even abuse of executive freedom.
Mapping war powers in contemporary democracies20
How do states deal with this trade-off between efficiency and legiti-
macy of military operations? Which rights do they grant to parlia-
ments? Parliamentary war powers are, of course, a multidimensional
concept encompassing budgetary powers, obligations of government to
report to parliament or rights to visit troops during deployment.21 We
will focus in this paper on the arguably most effective tool parliaments
can possess to control the executive’s use of force. According to Heiner
Ha¨nggi, ‘the strongest means of parliamentary oversight by far is [. . .]
the constitutional or legal right to approve or reject such use of
force’.22 Even this right of approval may take a variety of forms,
however, and may be differentiated, for example, according to the type
of mission or the stage of the decision-making process at which parlia-
ments become involved. We will begin our investigation by examining
how wide spread the most extensive form of this kind of parliamentary
involvement has become since the end of the Cold War: parliament’s
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right to veto troop deployments before they are launched. On this basis
we will then examine the main differentiations that have developed
among parliaments beneath this general level.
Our analysis is based on a new data collection we created for this
purpose, the ‘ParlCon’ data set. ParlCon assembles information about
the parliamentary control of military missions in 49 democracies over
the period 1989–2004. As levels of parliamentary control may change
over time, the country-year is the unit of analysis in ParlCon. Included
are countries that in a given year could be characterised as an uncon-
tested democracy. Following common practice, we used the POLITY
IV database to identify these established democracies. Accordingly,
every country that has a POLITY score of 9 or 10 in a given year was
included in ParlCon for that year.23 We then excluded those countries
that do not have military forces (namely Costa Rica, Mauritius, and
Panama) as well as Taiwan because of its special status as an entity
with very limited international recognition and its concomitant special
role with regard to military missions. Finally, we limit our analysis to
the period between the end of the Cold War, 1989, and 2004. All in
all, we have gathered data on 49 countries over varying periods of
time, yielding a total of 616 country-years.24 A complete list of
countries and their basic parliamentary war powers is reproduced in
the appendix.
Looking first at the share of countries whose parliament holds ex
ante veto power we find that a considerable minority of parliaments
enjoy such a right. As Figure 1 demonstrates, such veto power can be
found in about a third of democracies.25
All in all, 21 democracies had institutionalised parliamentary ex ante
veto right for at least some period of time, although four of them
Figure 1. Share of democracies with and without parliamentary ex ante veto power.
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abolished it during the period we studied. It is important to note that
this group of states has a highly varied composition. It includes NATO
states (e.g. Turkey or Denmark) as well as non-aligned countries (e.g.
Ireland or Austria), parliamentary systems (e.g. the four countries just
mentioned) and presidential ones (e.g. Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay or
Venezuela). The majority of countries, however, do not give parliament
a veto power over military missions. This latter group likewise includes
parliamentary systems (e.g. Canada, Thailand or, until 1996, Israel)
and presidential ones (e.g. Colombia, Ecuador, Madagascar or the
USA) as well as alliance members (e.g. Canada or Belgium) and non-
aligned states (e.g. India or Jamaica).
Although neither the presidentialism/parliamentarism distinction nor
alliance membership has any discernible impact on the presence or
absence of parliamentary war powers, it is remarkable that almost all
members of the Commonwealth, whose constitution has been heavily
influenced by the British role model with its doctrine of the royal pre-
rogative, assign war powers exclusively to the executive. Thus, Canada,
India, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, Botswana, South Africa,
Trinidad and Tobago and of course the UK itself all lack ex ante veto
power. In contrast, Papua New Guinea and, since 2003, Cyprus, are
the only Commonwealth members whose parliaments may veto
deployment decisions.
Figure 1 also suggests that the basic war power provisions have been
highly stable in most democracies. A change through which parliament
gained or lost its veto right took place in only five states during this
period, whereas no change occurred in 37, i.e. in almost 80% of the
states we look at. In the remaining states, rules for the deployment of
forces were created or clarified for the first time during the period we
cover and remained stable from there on.26 New rules were drawn up
especially in newly democratising states, where there were strong incen-
tives to give parliament a prominent role in deployment decisions
during the process of democratisation. Because concerns about a poss-
ible misuse of the military to oppress democratising forces both within
and outside the country were widespread in these countries, consti-
tutional provisions frequently introduced tight controls on the govern-
ment. Thus, soon after the end of authoritarian rule, parliamentary
veto power was introduced in the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. In Hungary where mem-
ories of being both a victim of and a participant in military interven-
tions to restore the Communist Party’s control of power were still alive,
the constitution even provided for a two-thirds majority of all MPs
(whether present or not) before troops could be deployed. Remarkably,
this trend towards parliamentary war powers was largely absent in new
democracies outside Europe such as Thailand or Peru. Apparently, in
these countries, concerns about a military coup against the legitimate
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democratic government were more important than concerns about the
misuse of the military by that government.
Where democratic constitutions were already in place and included
provisions on military missions they were sometimes limited to the case
of declaring war. With a view to contemporary deployments, they were
therefore of limited use since war has long ceased to be legitimate
under international law. In fact, the UN Charter has delegitimised any
use of force other than either in self-defence or on the basis of a
mandate of the Security Council. Originating in earlier periods of a
country’s constitutional history and having survived dramatic changes
in international law, such provisions called for further clarification for
missions other than war. Nonetheless, a considerable number of
countries refrained from any revision of their constitutional provisions
to the effect that parliament effectively lost all its war powers as the
only use of force it may authorise was outlawed under international
law. This holds true for Australia, Colombia, Mongolia, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain27 and Thailand. Other democracies filled this
lacuna by either amending or re-interpreting their constitutions. With
the exception of the post-socialist countries discussed above, few
countries opted for constitutional amendments, the Netherlands being
a rare exception.28 In other countries, constitutional courts were instru-
mental in (re-)interpreting constitutional provisions. For example, the
German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that the consti-
tutional provision according to which military force may only be used
in self-defence or in the framework of a collective security system,
allowed out of area missions in the framework of the UN or NATO.
The court also asked parliament to draft a deployment law which
entered into force in 2004.
We see much more reform activity, however, below the level of con-
stitutional revision. In adjusting their deployment provisions to changes
in the international use of force, most countries opted for secondary
legislation, either by way of specific deployment laws or as part of
more comprehensive military laws. Secondary legislation allowed for a
higher degree of differentiation between various types of military mis-
sions and for special regulations in case of emergency and consequently
for much more fine-grained parliamentary powers. Thus, many democ-
racies have found a more subtle balance between military and demo-
cratic requirements than the dichotomous choice between the presence
or absence of ex ante veto power suggests. Indeed, the complete exclu-
sion of parliament from decision-making over military deployments
and the full-blown parliamentary veto over all military operations are
but the two extreme ends of a continuum which includes a wealth of
provisions designed to fine tune the balance between military efficiency
and democratic legitimacy. On the one hand, some countries whose
parliament generally has an ex ante veto power have exempted certain
types of missions from this general rule to allow different mixtures of
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military efficiency and democratic legitimacy for different types of mili-
tary missions. On the other hand, many countries whose parliament
has no ex ante veto power nevertheless have granted parliament
various degrees of involvement in decision-making over military mis-
sions such as the right to be consulted or the power of ex post
approval. In a similar vein, some democracies have designed provisions
to allow a selected group of deputies—but not parliament as a whole—
to participate in decision-making on the use of force.
Many democracies require ex ante parliamentary approval for some
kinds of military missions but allow government to decide autono-
mously on others. Although several criteria for differentiation are dis-
cernible, the underlying idea remains the same, namely that different
missions require different balances between the requirements of mili-
tary efficiency and democratic control. This is most obvious with
regard to self-defence in case of an external attack which does not
require ex ante parliamentary approval in any state. Further differen-
tiations are frequently made on the basis of two criteria: first, several
democracies reserve ex ante approval to severe forms of military force
while exempting less severe ones; second, various democracies require
ex ante approval in general but exempt military missions which are
mandated by international organisations.
Exempting traditional peacekeeping operations (as in Sweden),
deployments of less than 12 soldiers (as in Ireland) or less than a
hundred soldiers and a duration of less than three weeks (as in
Switzerland) are typical examples of granting government exclusive
decision-making power in cases which are considered of minor impor-
tance. In such cases, which are unlikely to escalate and put the lives of
servicemen at risk, a lower standard of democratic legitimacy is con-
sidered sufficient. In a similar vein, the German deployment law pro-
vides for a simplified procedure for minor missions. Some countries
also provide for emergency procedures through which they enable gov-
ernment to deploy troops rapidly without consulting parliament in
cases of particular urgency. Usually, parliamentary approval has then
to be given ex post or else the troops have to be called back within a
certain time frame. Such provisions exist, e.g. in Austria (two weeks
timeframe), and for certain operations in Japan (20 days), in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia (60 days, respectively).
From a legal perspective, a mandate from the UN Security Council
under chapter VII of the UN Charter plays a pivotal role in this
context because any other use of force (with the exception of self-
defence) is illegitimate under international law. Remarkably, however,
a UN Security Council mandate does not render ex ante parliamentary
approval obsolete in any democracy we studied. Rather, in Ireland such
a mandate has been required in addition to parliamentary approval. In
the Irish ‘triple-lock’ system, a UN mandate is the first requirement for
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any military operation (government’s and parliament’s consent provid-
ing the keys to the second and third lock).
Although without the UN’s power to legitimise the use of force
under international law, regional organisations have assumed a more
prominent place in democracies’ deployment legislation, at least in
Europe.29 In Austria, for example, troops may only be deployed on
request of the UN, the EU or the OSCE. The Finnish armed forces
could only participate in traditional UN peacekeeping operations
before this was more and more extended in the 1990s and 2000s to
include OSCE-mandated action, UN peace support operations in a
wider sense and, today, basically any military operation mandated by
an international organisation. Similarly, the Canadian National
Defence Act, stipulates that Canadian forces may be activated for non-
defence purposes only to participate in missions under the UN Charter
or within NATO or similar organisations.
Whereas the countries just mentioned consider a regional organis-
ation’s mandate as an additional requirement to ex ante parliamentary
approval, other countries have regarded it as a substitute. Surprisingly
enough, this concerns especially newly democratised states which had
taken so much care to ensure tight parliamentary control over the
executive’s use of military force immediately after their transition to
democracy. In the context of their accessions to NATO and the EU,
many Central and Eastern European states chose to relax these restric-
tions and to abolish the parliamentary proviso for NATO and EU oper-
ations. This move usually was justified with requirements of military
efficiency (see also below).30 In Hungary, for example, parliament
enjoys a general veto right over military deployments. Yet parliamen-
tary approval is not needed if troops are deployed to NATO or EU mis-
sions. Similar exceptions exist in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Romania and Slovakia. These are exceptions of major importance, as
they exempt probably the largest proportion of operations in which
these countries participate from parliamentary veto and hence signifi-
cantly devalue the institution of parliamentary ex ante control.31
Variation also exists among those states which do not provide for
any form of parliamentary ex ante veto. Not all of these states comple-
tely exclude parliament from the decision-making process. To begin
with, the executive of course is free to turn to parliament and ask for
approval for any planned mission. For example, the government of
Tony Blair decided to have the House of Commons vote on a govern-
ment motion seeking authority for military action and the use of ‘all
necessary means’ to disarm Iraq. As the example illustrates, such votes
are frequently asked for by governments in order to increase the legiti-
macy of military operations and to ensure that the efficiency of an
operation cannot be undermined by parliamentary opposition to the
deployment. This may, in certain cases, give parliamentarians some
influence on the operation. But when the involvement of parliament is
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exclusively at the government’s discretion, there is a very fine line
between meaningful consultation with parliament and the goal of
simply having executive decisions rubberstamped. On the other hand,
the case of Norway illustrates that consultation may become such a
common practice that it develops into a de facto obligation that is
acknowledged by both government and parliament even in the absence
of any legal obligation. A similar development took place in the
Netherlands where the tacit obligation to consult Parliament was even-
tually formalised in a new constitutional article in 2000.
Some countries likewise formalise the involvement of parliament
without giving it actual veto power. This can be achieved by requiring
government to consult with parliament over military deployments and
such consultation procedures may take on a wide variety of forms. In
some countries, government must inform parliament about deployment
decisions but only after the deployment has been made. Having to
notify parliament immediately (Poland), without undue delay
(Slovakia), if it is assembled (Ecuador) or within five or seven days
(Romania, Canada and South Africa), ensures that the armed forces
cannot be sent abroad secretively. Yet it will not do much to increase
parliamentary leverage over deployment decisions.
The US War Powers Resolution has set yet another standard for bal-
ancing military and democratic requirements that has been broadly dis-
cussed because its binding character has been contested and because of
the frequency of US military interventions. The War Powers Resolution
that Congress agreed in 1973 not only obliged government to consult
Congress before any deployment but has furthermore given Congress a
right to approve any mission ex post. According to section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution, the President shall terminate any deployment
within 60 days ‘unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has
enacted a specific authorisation for such use of US Armed Forces, (2)
has extended by law such 60-day period or (3) is physically unable to
meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States’.32 This
amounts to a right to call back troops that have already been deployed.
Congress’s right of ex post approval has inspired the reform of deploy-
ment legislation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both countries
now allow government to decide autonomously about the deployment
of troops for 60 days, although this provision only applies to the fulfil-
ment of international treaty obligations.33 However, given that the
public and its representatives in parliament tend to rally behind the
executive once hostilities started, the right to call back troops can only
be exercised at considerable political costs, rendering ex post approval
far less effective than an ex ante veto power.
Our map of parliamentary war powers becomes even more complex
if we consider that it is not always parliament as a whole, i.e. the
plenary, that is granted a say in decision-making over the use of force.
In Austria, for example, it is parliament’s ‘main committee’ that
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discusses and decides on military deployments. In several other states,
only individual parliamentarians are involved in decision-making
before the deployment decision is made. In Portugal, for example,
members of parliament are represented in the Superior Council of
National Defence. Although the Council does not have decision-
making competences on troop deployments and is, moreover, domi-
nated by the executive it may nonetheless provide parliamentarians
with a formal channel to influence government decisions at an early
stage. Similarly, in Greece, two members of all parties represented in
parliament sit on the National Council on Foreign Policy (NCFP) that
was established in 2003 to improve democratic oversight by bringing
together members of the executive and the legislative. Like the
Portuguese Superior Council of National Defence, the NCFP is a
purely advisory body with no formal decision-making power. In
Mongolia the speaker of parliament is member of the National
Security Council. The National Security Council, in turn, makes the
deployment decision unanimously so that some representation of par-
liament in decision-making is guaranteed without giving parliament as
such a full-blown veto opportunity.
Looking at all these variations beneath the level of broad classifi-
cations, it is obvious that parliamentary control rights can be conceived
as a continuum, delimited by two extreme points. At one extreme, par-
liaments have no say whatsoever in any deployment decision. At the
other side of the spectrum parliamentary consent is required for all
operations. In between these two extremes, there is a dazzling range of
options giving parliament a more or less tightly institutionalised con-
sultative role or a say in an increasingly large set of military operations.
Towards a parliamentarisation of war powers?
With a view to the growing number of UN military missions, Lori
Damrosch argued that there was a discernible ‘trend since the Second
World War of legislative involvement in decisions to authorise partici-
pation’.34 Whereas our data do not allow mapping developments in
war powers over the entire post-WW II period, our examination of the
period since the end of the Cold War casts some doubts on this thesis.
First, as discussed above, the share of democracies with parliamentary
veto powers has not been rising over the period 1989–2004—even
though changes in this figure result first and foremost from countries
being added and taken out of our sample due to changing scores on
POLITY’s democraticness scale.
Second, and more importantly, a closer look at cases of rule modifi-
cation reveals that parliaments usually lose powers when existing pro-
visions are substantially modified. Veto powers that had been in place
were abolished in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and the
Slovak Republic. On the other hand, a parliamentary veto right was
introduced only in Cyprus. Thus, at least since the end of the Cold
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War, any trend towards a parliamentarisation of war powers has come
to a halt or has even been reversed.35
On closer inspection, the instances of rule change display another
interesting characteristic. Throughout, the cases in which veto powers
were abolished concern Central and Eastern European transformation
states that prepared for accession to NATO (and the EU), namely
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Especially
NATO accession apparently amplified the trade-off between creating
legitimacy through procedures of ex ante parliamentary control and
gaining efficiency through lean, executive-centred decision-making.
From a NATO perspective, having some member state governments
tied to domestic parliamentary veto power must seem highly unattrac-
tive. Arriving at unanimous decisions in the North Atlantic Council is
difficult already, especially after NATO enlargement. The prospect of
having domestic parliaments veto a deployment even after a decision
had been arrived at in the North Atlantic Council therefore created
some unease on the NATO level. NATO’s efforts to limit national par-
liaments’ interference in decision-making focused on the states in the
accession process and to which conditionality therefore applied. In
Hungary, then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson went as far as
publicly naming Hungary as a member state whose constitution would
not allow for deployments in NATO missions.36 In this context, some
governments of Central and Eastern European states successfully
initiated changes in their domestic deployment rules. The result was
that in these states NATO missions or other missions carried out
within an international framework were exempted from parliamentary
veto. As most military operations that are carried out nowadays are
multilateral operations within such a framework, this implied in prac-
tice the abolishing of the parliamentary veto. The Bulgarian President
Parvanov, for example, was ready to propose a modification of the
constitutional text so as to make article 84 (11) applicable only to
non-NATO operations, e.g. by adding the words ’except in cases where
the Republic of Bulgaria is a party to international treaties and fulfils
the obligation specified in them.’37 In 2003, the Constitutional Court
decided that no changes would be necessary and that article 84 (11) of
the constitution would not apply to obligations by an international
treaty that has been ratified, promulgated and become effective in the
Republic of Bulgaria. Consequently, there would be no need for having
the National Assembly’s permission for deployments if they were
derived from international treaty obligations.
The trend towards a de-parliamentarisation of war powers has been
most pronounced in Central and Eastern European democracies where
the prospect of NATO accession served as an important incentive. Yet
similar debates can be found in the older NATO members as well, even
though they did not result in changes in deployment provisions. For
example, Germany’s Christian Democrats argued that a parliamentary
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veto power did not square well with the requirements of integrated
multinational rapid response forces such as NATO’s Response Force
and the European Union’s Battlegroups. MP Schockenhoff argued that
individual parts of an integrated military unit cannot be held under a
parliamentary proviso.38 In a similar vein, Home Secretary Scha¨uble
and Parliamentary Secretary of State Christian Schmidt suggested that
parliament should vote on a motion at the beginning of each parlia-
mentary term that would delegate decision-making on the deployment
of multinational integrated units to the government.39 Although the
proposals eventually failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority,
they illustrate that democracies with comprehensive parliamentary war
powers have come under pressure as a result of the internationalisation
of security politics.
It is interesting to note that the trend towards de-parliamentarisation
is unrelated to the main political event in the period under consider-
ation, namely the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington. Although ‘9/11’ had a tremendous impact on many
aspects of security politics, it left democracies’ deployment regimes by
and large intact. Where changes in deployment rules were discussed or
implemented after 2001, the challenge of international terrorism did
not provide a key rationale. Rather efficiency requirements of multilat-
eral operations in general served as the crucial point of reference. The
only exception we are aware of is Japan whose Parliament passed an
‘Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law’ in October 2001 that allows
for sending armed forces without ex ante parliamentary approval if
they support the USA and its allies in the combat of terrorism. Instead,
parliamentary approval is only required within three weeks after the
deployment began. On the basis of this law, Japan has sent maritime
units to the Indian Ocean as rear area support to the US troops in
Afghanistan and some 550 noncombat troops to Iraq. However, the
‘Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law’ explicitly provides these mili-
tary measures ‘must not constitute the threat or use of force’.40
Conclusion
As the plethora of amendments and revisions of deployment provisions
since the end of the Cold War demonstrates, war powers have remained
a particularly contested issue in legislative-executive relations, both in
presidential and parliamentary systems and in aligned as well as non-
aligned countries. A trend towards parliamentarisation, as diagnosed
by Lori Damrosh, has not been confirmed by our data. If anything,
there has been a trend towards ever more differentiation, particularly
as to various types of military missions and the institutional settings in
which they take place. Members of NATO in particular have found
themselves under pressure to adapt to new forms of multi-level
decision-making over military deployments that result from the estab-
lishment of integrated multinational military units. Because the
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multinational integration of armed forces is seen to contribute to a
more efficient spending of scarce resources and to trust and solidarity
among allies, tensions between parliamentary control and the efficient
deployability of multinational units are likely to remain challenges for
the time being.
The trend towards differentiation of war powers is also likely to
endure because military missions continue to become ever more
complex. Three developments are worth highlighting in particular.
First, especially within the European Union’s Security and Defence
Policy, an increasing number of peace support missions rely on police
and gendarmerie forces, rather than the military. However, deployment
legislation in many countries only covers military missions and remains
silent on deployments of police or gendarmerie forces. As a conse-
quence, parliaments have been involved in unsystematic ways and on an
ad hoc basis.41 Second, some democracies have emulated the big mili-
tary powers in setting up special forces for covert operations. In
Germany, for example, a ‘Kommando Spezialkra¨fte’ has been estab-
lished in the second half of the 1990s. Although the German Bundestag
has far-reaching powers to control military missions in general, the
deployments of the ‘Kommando Spezialkra¨fte’ have been shielded from
parliamentary scrutiny which in turn has given rise to calls for clarifica-
tion in an amendment to the deployment law.42 Third, and finally,
Private Military Companies (PMCs) have become an indispensible part
of many military missions, most prominently in Iraq where PMCs have
contributed more forces than any other member of the US-led coalition,
being almost equal to all the states excluding the US combined.43
Monitoring problems characteristic of outsourcing in general are exacer-
bated in military missions taking place in far away conflict zones.
Likewise, the difficulties that governments experienced in controlling
the activities of PMCs dwarf against those of parliaments that find
themselves at the end of a chain of delegation.44 As the three develop-
ments outlined above are all likely to continue, democracies either risk
having parliaments increasingly sidelined or have to pass further amend-
ments in their deployment legislation. As a result, parliamentary war
powers are likely to become even more complex in the future.
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Appendix: Presence/absence of ex ante parliamentary veto
power over military missions, 1989–2004
Country Country-years Presence/absence of ex ante parliamentary veto power
Australia 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Austria 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Belgium 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Bolivia 1989–2002 Prior parliamentary approval required
Botswana 1997–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Bulgaria 2001–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required (2001–2002)
No prior parliamentary approval required (2003–2004)
Canada 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Chile 2000–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required (2000–2003)
Inconclusive (2004)
Colombia 1991–1994 No prior parliamentary approval required
Cyprus 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required (1989–2003)
Prior parliamentary approval required (2004)
Czech Republic 1993–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required (1993–2000)
No prior parliamentary approval required (2001–2004)
Denmark 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Ecuador 1989–1996, No prior parliamentary
1998–1999 approval required
Finland 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
France 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Germany 1989–2004 Inconclusive (1989–1994)
Prior parliamentary approval required (1995–2004)
Greece 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Hungary 1990–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required (1990–2003)
No prior parliamentary approval required (2004)
India 1995–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Ireland 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Israel 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Italy 1989–2004 Inconclusive
Jamaica 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Japan 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Lithuania 1991–2004 Inconclusive (1991–1992)
Prior parliamentary approval required (1993–2004)
Macedonia 2002–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Madagascar 1992–1996 No prior parliamentary approval required
Mongolia 1992–2004 Inconclusive (1992–2001)
No prior parliamentary approval required (2002–2004)
Netherlands 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
New Zealand 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Norway 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Papua New Guinea 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Peru 2001–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Poland 1995–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Portugal 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Romania 2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Slovakia 1998–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required (1998–2000)
No prior parliamentary approval required (2001–2004)
Continued
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Continued
Country Country-years Presence/absence of ex ante parliamentary veto power
Slovenia 1991–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
South Africa 1994–2004 Inconclusive (1994–1996)
No prior parliamentary approval required (1997–2004)
Spain 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Sweden 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Switzerland 1989–2004 Inconclusive (1989–2001)
Prior parliamentary approval required (2002–2004)
Thailand 1992–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Trinidad 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Turkey 1989–1992 Prior parliamentary approval required
UK 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
USA 1989–2004 No prior parliamentary approval required
Uruguay 1989–2004 Prior parliamentary approval required
Venezuela 1989–1991 Prior parliamentary approval required
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